Vietnam’s conflicted human rights policy

Carlyle A. Thayer

By Carlyle A. Thayer | August 2013

Vietnam’s human rights policy is marked by contradictions and paradox—by increased openness and continued repression.

Any assessment of human rights and religious freedom in contemporary Vietnam must confront contradictions in policy implementation and a major paradox.

Vietnam’s 1992 state constitution makes provision for freedom of speech. Article 69 declares ’[t]he citizen shall enjoy freedom of opinion and speech, freedom of the press, the right to be informed, and the right to assemble, form associations, and hold demonstrations in accordance with the provisions of the law’. Contradictions in policy implementation arise from Article 4 that establishes a one-party political system. This article states, ‘[t]he Communist Party of Vietnam… is the force leading State and society’.

At the same time Vietnam confronts a major paradox. Since the last national party congress held in early 2011 Vietnam has sought to proactively integrate with the global system. As Vietnam has sought to expand its relations with the United States and Europe it has come under pressure to improve its human rights situation. For example, US Acting Assistant Secretary of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Joseph Yun, testified before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific on 5 June:

we have underscored with the Vietnamese leadership that the American people will not support a dramatic upgrading of our bilateral ties without demonstrable progress on human rights.

Other US officials have linked ending the arms embargo and reaching agreement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to ‘demonstrable progress on human rights’. The major paradox lies in the fact that Vietnam’s human rights record has got worse, not improved in recent years, thus making more difficult its self-proclaimed objective of proactive international integration. Because Vietnam is a one-party state there is no independent body to ensure that the freedoms enumerated in Article 69 are observed. The contradictions inherent in this political reality have led to the present situation, where unprecedented political opening up via the internet, and repression, coexist at the same time.

In its assessment of human rights in Vietnam, in 2012, Amnesty International concluded bluntly:

repression of government critics and activists worsened, with severe restrictions on freedom of expression, association and assembly. At least 25 peaceful dissidents, including bloggers and songwriters, were sentenced to long prison terms in 14 trials that failed to meet international standards.

Echoing this conclusion, the US Department of State’s annual report on human rights, also covering events in 2012, noted ‘a subcurrent of state-sponsored repression and persecution of individuals whose speech crossed boundaries and addresses sensitive issues such as criticizing the state’s foreign policies in regards to China or questioning the monopoly power of the communist party’. Yet the State Department report also observed ‘[o]n the surface, private expression, public journalism, and even political speech in Vietnam show signs of enhanced freedom’.

A review of human rights developments in Vietnam during the first half of 2013 reveals a continuation of contradictions in implementing the country’s human rights policy and the paradox of its seeking increased engagement with the United States while engaging in increased repression of human rights activists at the same time.

In late 2012, Vietnam’s crackdown on political dissidents led the United States to abruptly cancel its participation in the annual human rights dialogue with Vietnam in Hanoi. The dialogue was held in April 2013. The United States was represented by Daniel Baer, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. During his visit he was physically prevented from meeting with high-profile dissidents Nguyen Van Hai (Dieu Cay) and Pham Hong Son. Two months later Baer testified before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific and drew attention to the contradictions in Vietnam’s observance of human rights. On the one hand, Baer noted:

positive steps such as the release (albeit with restrictions) of activist Le Cong Dinh, facilitation of a visit by an international human rights organization, and a modest uptick in church registrations in the Highlands… discussions between the government and the Vatican, and also what appears to be potential positive movement for the human rights of LGBT [lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender] persons… [and] the flood of public comments about the draft Constitution …

On the other hand, Baer concluded:

but these steps are not enough to reverse a year-long trend of deterioration. Nor have the isolated positive steps formed a consistent pattern. In increasing numbers, bloggers continue to be harassed and jailed for peaceful online speech and activists live under a continual cloud …

It is now known that in late March and April 2013 US and Vietnamese officials began discussions on the visit by President Truong Tan Sang to the United States, the first visit by a Vietnamese president in six years. The United States formally extended an invitation in July and Vietnam accepted. There is no evidence that Vietnam attempted to set the scene for Sang’s visit by releasing any high-profile dissidents. There was one possible straw in the wind. On 8 July Vietnamese authorities abruptly postponed the trial of prominent prodemocracy activist lawyer Le Quoc Quan.

Yet in contradiction, Vietnam continued to repress dissidents at the possible risk to President Sang’s visit to Washington.

In May–June, Vietnam convicted and imposed harsh sentences on two university students (Nguyen Phuong Uyen and Dinh Nguyen Kha) and three well-known bloggers (Dinh Nhat Uy, Truong Duy Nhat and Pham Viet Dao). This brought the total of political dissidents and bloggers arrested in the first half of 2013 to 46.

Presidents Obama and Sang met in The White House on 25 July. At a joint press conference President Obama stated, ‘we had a very candid conversation about both the progress that Vietnam is making and the challenges that remain’. Sang acknowledged differences and revealed that President Obama promised to do his best to visit Vietnam before the expiration of his term in office.

A joint statement issued after their meeting listed human rights eighth out of nine topics discussed. The two leaders ‘took note of the benefits of a candid and open dialogue to enhance mutual understanding and narrow differences on human rights’. No mention was made of the human  rights issues raised by President Obama. Point eight of the joint statement devoted seven of its nine lines to summarising what President Sang had discussed with his American counterpart. Notably, President Sang affirmed that Vietnam would sign the United Nations Convention against Torture and would invite the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief to visit Vietnam in 2014.

President Sang’s visit was overshadowed by an extended hunger strike by political activist Nguyen Van Hai. Hai founded the Club of Free Journalists and agitated for human rights and democratic reforms. Despite constitutional provisions for freedom of speech, he was imprisoned for 12 years for conducting ‘propaganda against the socialist state’ through blogs on the internet and articles broadcast overseas. While Hai was imprisoned, President Obama publicly called for his release.

Hai began a hunger strike in late June to protest his treatment in prison, including extended periods in solitary confinement. Two days after President Sang concluded his visit, Vietnam’s Supreme People’s Procuracy announced that it would investigate Hai’s allegations. Hai then ended his 35-day hunger strike.

How can the contradictions in Vietnam’s implementation of its human rights policy be explained? And further, how can the paradox of Vietnam seeking engagement with the United States while intensifying repression at the same time be explained? There are three possible but not mutually exclusive explanations for Vietnam’s contradictions and paradox.

[pullquote]Party conservatives are fearful that closer ties with the United States will exacerbate relations with China.[/pullquote]

First, continued political repression is the result of the Ministry of Public Security’s (MPS) bureaucratic process. When a political activist comes to its attention, the MPS routinely begins to assemble a file by gathering evidence. Once the MPS determines that a political dissident has violated Vietnam’s vaguely worded national security laws it begins a campaign of intimidation and harassment of the dissident and the dissident’s family and friends. If the dissident refuses to buckle under the MPS seeks approval from higher authority to arrest and hold a show trial.

Why are some dissidents repressed while others are permitted to voice similar opinions without retribution? In other words, why is there a contradiction between increased openness and continued repression?

Vietnam openly promotes the internet and encourages its citizens to speak out on a number of issues. However, dissidents will be subject to repression if they cross one wellknown red line—making contact with overseas Vietnamese, particularly political groups like Viet Tan that are deemed reactionary by the regime.

In summary, the MPS concludes that these dissidents are part of the ‘plot of peaceful evolution’, whereby hostile external forces link up with domestic reactionaries to overthrow Vietnam’s socialist regime. Another explanation for the contradiction in simultaneous openness and repression lies in Communist Party infighting. Political dissidents, particularly bloggers, raise sensitive issues regarding corruption, nepotism and the business interests of leading political figures. In these cases the dissidents are singled out for punishment at the behest of senior party officials or their supporters. In other words, domestic political considerations are the prime drivers of repression.

A third explanation argues that increased political repression in Vietnam is orchestrated by party conservatives who seek to disrupt, if not sabotage, the development of closer relations with the United States, particularly in the defence–security realm. For example, it is alleged that party conservatives orchestrated the June crackdown on bloggers to sabotage the first visit to Washington by the Vietnam People’s Army’s chief of staff. Party conservatives are fearful that closer ties with the United States will exacerbate relations with China. Bloggers and activists who criticise the government’s handling of relations with China are targeted in particular.

Party conservatives reject US pressures on human rights, call for increased US funding to address the wartime legacies of unexploded ordnance and Agent Orange, and demand an end to the discriminatory US arms embargo. The third explanation explains the paradox of why Vietnam does not address its human rights record in order to shore up defence relations with the United States in light of its territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea.

Carlyle A. Thayer is Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy

* Source: Asian Studies Association of Australia